'Causes of the Second Punic War Essay\r'

'The help punic contend â€Å"was the swellest and or so(prenominal) dangerous angiotensin converting enzyme capital of Italy was compel lead to s inductter on their bearing to the conquest of the Mediterranean. ” With 17 years of battle causing big(p) casualties to be suffered on both sides, the blurb Punic War has assayn to be an important quantify period in the Roman and Punic empires. For capital of Italy, the end of the contendfare meant â€Å"the defection of most S appearhern Italy” (Kagan 232, 1995) and galore(postnominal) economic problems. For Carth long time this meant the end of their rise to power, and the acknowledgment that the idea of Mediterranean control universe base in Africa rather than atomic number 63 was no longer a adventure (Kagan 233, 1995).\r\nBoth empires had a lot at stake upon entering the struggle, alone as will be discussed, many historians cerebrate that eventual conflict was inevit adequate to(p). Past grievan ces and battles faveolate the Romans and Carthaginians against one a nonher ultimately lede to the blink of an eye Punic War and the resulting spill of Carthage. The ancient sources written by Livy, Polybius Dio Cassius and Appian address a great deal of accuse on Hannibal in starting the snatch Punic War. Though some of the authors liberate his actions to an extent, Hannibal’s invasion of Saguntum is pin shewed as the flying cause of the Second Punic War.\r\nDio Cassius and Appian risk little sympathy in the motives bottomland Hannibal’s actions. As discussed by all(a)(prenominal) of the writers, Hannibal’s father, after the loss of Sicily, harbored utmost(prenominal) hatred toward the Romans and instilled these feelings into Hannibal from a very two-year-old age. All four authors mention an sworn statement interpreted by Hannibal at age nine in which he vowed vindicate against the Romans for their unjust actions. Livy writes that this gadfly à ¢â‚¬Å"bound Hannibal to prove himself, as soon as he could, an enemy to the Roman people” (Kagan 93-94, 1975).\r\n trustworthy enough, upon ascending to power, â€Å"as if Italy had been decreed to him as his province, and the war with capital of Italy committed to him,” (Kagan 95, 1975) Hannibal marched toward Saguntum with the companionship that this would get a rise out of the Romans. Ultimately, Livy asserts that the turn on is dependent on â€Å"whether it was allowed to be done by the accordance” (Kagan 103, 1975). Polybius outlines trey clear causes of the Second Punic war. setoff, as other ancient authors, Polybius tiptops to Hannibal’s oath and long rooting grudge against the Romans.\r\nHowever, he continues to formulate the reasons for Hannibal’s rage, the First Punic War, which Polybius calls â€Å"the most important cause of the subsequent war” (Kagan106, 1975). At the close of the mercenary war, Carthage did all it could t o avoid conflict with capital of Italy, eventually be them Sardinia and large indemnities that were to paid to the Romans both straight off and over time. This unequal accord on the partly of the Romans is the booster cable federal agent in Carthage’s hatred toward capital of Italy. Thirdly, Polybius credits the Carthaginian successes in Ibera as the third leading cause of the Second Punic war.\r\nHaving secured a great deal of territory and set ahead motivated by victories, Carthage felt that they were impregnable and powerful enough to take on capital of Italy. It is for this reason that Hannibal chose to attack Saguntum at this time to elicit a chemical reaction from the great empire. Upon being confronted by the Romans, Hannibal does not give way the real underlying causes for his attack, but insists quite that it is retaliation for the Carthaginian leaders put to death by Roman arbitrators in Saguntum. Polybius makes an interesting point that this failure to ruin his true motives may have caused much than blame to fall on Hannibal’s shoulders.\r\nPolybius writes, â€Å"he had not said a word of the real cause, but asseverate the fictitious one of the matter of Saguntum; and so go the credit of beginning the war” (Kagan 107, 1975) This assertion is important to consider in analyzing the ancient sources, as many take hold a pro-Roman bias. Polybius recognizes that the immediate action that brought the war was that of Hannibal, but a analogous that â€Å"we must confess that the Carthaginians had good reason for underpickings the Hannibalian war. ” (Kagan 109, 1975).\r\nIn his essay â€Å"The Case for capital of Italy,” rough argues that â€Å"the nations came to blows because the Barcid family were able to keep alive the bitter feelings emotional by former defeats” (Kagan 118, 1975). As with Polybius, dog discusses the true nature of the attack versus the assuage for battle Hannibal was stati ng. Throughout the exchange of embassies and the lead-up to the Roman and Carthaginian battles, Hannibal never wavered from his assertion that Carthage was seek revenge for those officials who had been executed in Saguntum.\r\n bounder continues on to state his opinion that the war amongst the two empires was not inevitable, but rather a matter of Hannibal and the Carthaginians scatty to restore their pride. In comparing bounder to other new-make authors, he is ofttimes less sensitive to the wrongdoings on the part of Rome. inconsiderate faults Hannibal for the beginning of the war, justifying the alliance with Saguntum and charge Hannibal of starting a war ground on illegitimate grudges. In his essay, Frank claims that â€Å"an unwelcome war had been thrust” (Kagan 119, 1975) upon Rome.\r\nIn analyzing the other modern sources, it is evident that Frank’s view is the uncommon one and that Rome was in circumstance an initiator in the Second Punic war. objet d art Hallward acknowledges the anger of Carthage as a factor in Hannibal’s actions, he is in addition quite hard on the Romans for their unjust actions following the First Punic War. â€Å"In 237 B. C. , the Romans, with no shadow of recompense, had forced Carthage to deport Sardinia and to pay an additional indemnity of 1200 talents” (Kagan 120, 1975).\r\nHallward acknowledges that it was international the honourable and legitimate realm of Rome to seize Sardinia and force the payment of such(prenominal) steep indemnities. He continues to discuss the limitations confabulate on Carthage with the Ebro accord. As Rome grew much concerned with Carthage’s advancements in Spain, they alikek utility of the times to impose the conformity and border Carthage from advancing past the Ebro River. An important chance of the Ebro accordance is the implications that came with it. This treaty implies that Rome would not hinder Carthaginian expansion up to the Riv er.\r\nThough dates are unclear, had the alliance with Saguntum already existed, it was an â€Å"implied obligation on Rome not to use the town [Saguntum] as an pawn to hinder Carthaginian expansion inside the sphere recognized as pay to her” (Kagan 120, 1975). Rome failed to stay out of Carthage’s way and became a bother and a hindrance in their quest for expansion. In Saguntum, Rome â€Å"intervened to bring into power, not without bloodshed, a party hostile to Carthage and to promote skirmish with the neighboring tribe of the Torboletae, who were subjects of the Carthaginians” (Kagan 120, 1975).\r\nNot unless was this alliance against unjust in that it was against the affectionateness of the treaty, but it was also evokeful on Rome’s part. In the eight months in which Saguntum and Carthage were battling, Rome was hesitant to pull support. Saguntum was â€Å"unimportant and distant, and the material interests of Rome were saved in the Ebro trea ty” (Kagan 121, 1975). However, in spite of having so little to gain, Rome chased an alliance with this nation to hinder Carthage and impose themselves in the Carthaginian realm.\r\nAll of these actions on Rome’s part were bitter reminders of the unfair treatment Carthage had received since the First Punic war. Though past grudges vie a key role, Rome’s continued hostilities and instigatory actions gave good cause for the miserly feelings to continue, and ultimately led Carthage, under Hannibal’s command, to seizing Saguntum as a way of bringing forth a response from Rome. Throughout his essay, Scullard asserts that Hannibal and Carthage were at bottom their legal and moral right in seizing Saguntum.\r\nScullard bases this last on his analysis of the treaties that existed between Rome and Carthage at that time. He first addresses the treaty made with Lutatius in 241. He states that Carthage was at heart their rights because â€Å"Rome’s allia nce with Saguntum was ulterior than the treaty of Lutatius, so that the town was not included in the list of Rome’s allies whom the Carthaginians had promised to respect” (Kagan 123, 1975) In regards to the Treaty of Ebro, he points to the simple geographic fact that Saguntum was located 100 miles in the south of the Ebro River, well in the domain which Carthage had been promised.\r\n too in regards to this treaty, Scullard mentions a similar point to Hallward in that Saguntum â€Å"could not in truth be used by the Romans as a handle to check Punic expansion in the south” (Kagan 124, 1975). Scullard also addresses Hannibal’s hatred of Rome which is discussed in so many other sources. Scullard asserts that though there is evidence and cause for the hatred, Hamilcar travel into Spain with â€Å"the intention of re-establishing his country’s wooly empire,” not seeking revenge.\r\nBased on the treaties which had been made, and the unjust act ions of Rome, Scullard states â€Å"Rome had no legal ground to restrain Hannibal from attacking Saguntum, he was within his legal rights and was no treaty breaker” (Kagan 124, 1975). As with the other modern writers, Errington acknowledges the anger of Hannibal but does not point to these emotions as the cause for war. Instead, Errington recognizes the wrong doing of Rome in the events leading up to the Second Punic war.\r\nIt is vital to understand that â€Å"the stillness of 241 and Rome’s subsequent appropriation of Sardinia were presented as the bitter Barcid disappointment which precipitated some other war 23 years ulterior” (Errington, 53). It is authoritative to understand the reasoning rump Hannibal’s anger, rather than condemn him as a tempered, vengeful leader. Errington continues to write closely the â€Å"unwarranted interference with Carthage’s friends in Saguntum. ” This arbitration and newfound friendship with Saguntum reminded Carthage too much of the convenient alliances Rome had made in the past with the Mamerties and the Sardinian mercenaries. Errington 55-56).\r\nIn concluding, he addresses the â€Å"Roman traditions” regarding the Punic war, which severely blamed Hannibal for the beginning of the war. He evaluates these claims as simplified and â€Å"grotesquely wrong” (Scullard, 60) insist that the Romans played a part in inviting the war through their actions against Carthage. In Kagan’s chapter on the Second War, he gives an in depth background which allows the reader to in full grasp and understand the circumstances which led to the actions and emotions of both empires. The peacetime between the two wars was crucial in leading up to the back up Punic war.\r\nDuring this time, Romans involved themselves in a war in Sardinia at the gather up of the mercenaries. This involvement against Carthage â€Å"was a clear entrancement of the treaty of 241 and without any respectable semblance” (Kagan 253). The Romans knowingly and blatantly stony-broke the treaty which had been formed between the two nations. in one case involved, Rome took advantage of their situation and demanded Sardinia and extensive indemnities from Carthage. The Carthaginians were forced to reluctantly accept, but they resented that their treaty had been violated and that they taken advantage of.\r\nThis fortitude â€Å"reflected the relationship of power between Rome and Carthage at a time when Carthage was artificially weak” (Kagan 255). As the empire gained it’s power back through Spain, they became more confident in their abilities to match up against Rome, and Rome became more nervous regarding their tycoon to do so. Kagan discusses the alliance made between Saguntum and Rome and concludes that either way, Rome was in the wrong. Had the alliance occurred beforehand, it should have been included in the treaty, but had it been afterward, then it wa s a ingest violation of the Ebro treaty.\r\nEither way, Rome was in the wrong to try to prevent Carthage from taking Saguntum, a city of little splendour or value to the Roman empire. Kagan, like other authors, addresses the Roman tradition of blaming Hannibal’s oath and anger. Kagan argues â€Å"the rejection of the wrath and the oath leads to a diminution in the responsibility of Carthage. It is likely to see its behavior as exclusively reactive and defensive” (Kagan 270, 1995). In Hannibal’s quest to restore the empire which had been taken fro him, Carthage pushed through Spain in the territory they were permitted. In this view, Hannibal’s attack on Saguntum broke no treaty and was justified by any fair understanding of the Ebro treaty” (Kagan 270, 1995). Each of the authors offered a similar story, but the bias and blame was placed otherwise in each piece. The ancient writers calculate to fall into the trap of the â€Å"Roman traditions,à ¢â‚¬Â faulting Hannibal hard for the vengeance he felt toward Rome throughout his life. However, as we move to the more modern authors, it is apparent that Carthage’s actions were but a consequence and reply to those of Rome.\r\nHannibal was within his rights of both treaties when he attacked Saguntum, and it was not the right of Rome to become involved. Carthage had been undermined by Rome on several occasions, and they were right to stand up against Rome in the look of further injustice. While the immediate blame for the Second Punic war may fall on Hannibal and his invasion of Saguntum based on Roman hatred, it is important to ensure that the underlying causes of the war were in fact instigated by Rome and their policies in the introductory decades.\r\n'